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Introduction

In State v. Lile, the Washington Supreme Court addressed whether a judge’s decision to grant a continuance—even one agreed to by both parties—constitutes a discretionary ruling under RCW 4.12.050, thereby affecting the timeliness of affidavits of prejudice.

Under RCW 4.12.050, a party or attorney may file an affidavit of prejudice to disqualify a judge—but only before the judge has made any discretionary ruling in the case Justia Law+15Washington Courts+15Washington Courts+15Washington Courts.
Washington courts historically carved out exceptions: certain routine scheduling actions—like agreeing to continuances or arranging hearings—were considered non‑discretionary and thus didn’t bar a timely recusal notice Washington State Legislature.

Facts of Lile

Lile, involved in criminal proceedings in Whatcom County, approached Judge Uhrig during a status hearing to request a one‑week continuance of his trial. The judge orally granted it and later finalized it in writing. Soon after, Lile filed an affidavit of prejudice. The judge ruled it untimely, finding that the continuance decision was discretionaryWikipedia+14Justia Law+14vLex+14.

Supreme Court’s Holding

The Washington Supreme Court held that granting a trial continuance—even if jointly requested—is a discretionary ruling under RCW 4.12.050 Washington Courts+11Justia Law+11Washington Courts+11. The court emphasized that:

  • The substance and impact of a judicial decision—not just its form—determine whether it is discretionary. Agreements that implicate the court’s scheduling burdens are treated as involving judicial discretionWikipedia+15Washington Courts+15vLex+15.
  • Continuance decisions affect court administration, cause case delays, and potentially impact the rights of other litigants—thus involving discrete judicial decision‑making beyond mere ministerial function Washington CourtsWashington Courts.

Reasoning: Substance over Form

The Supreme Court rejected the notion that agreed continuances are categorically non‑discretionary. Instead, following precedent in Parra and Recall of Lindquist, the Court clarified:

“To either grant or deny a motion involves discretion” Justia Law+6Washington Courts+6Washington Courts+6.

Even if both parties invite the court to continue the case, the judge must still consider factors such as diligence, due process, materiality, orderly procedure, and impact on the trial schedule—which makes it discretionary under RCW 4.12.050 Washington State Legislature+12Washington Courts+12Washington Courts+12.

Impact and Subsequent Application

On Affidavits of Prejudice

An affidavit filed after such a discretionary continuance is untimely and thus ineffective under RCW 4.12.050 Justia Law+1Washington Courts+1.

On Non‑discretionary Orders

In contrast, courts have reaffirmed that stipulated orders extending witness disclosure deadlines—which affect only party convenience and do not alter court scheduling—are non‑discretionary, and thus do not bar timely affidavits of prejudice